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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In his opening brief, Terence Pak Sing Tsui argued the district court erred in
denying his motion to suppress because the probation and parole officer who frisked
him during a residence check of a third party did not have reason to believe, at the
moment of the frisk, that Mr. Tsui was armed and presently dangerous, and the illegal
drugs were discovered on Mr. Tsui as a result of the frisk, and would not have been
discovered but for the frisk. In response, the State argues the district court correctly
concluded the frisk was lawful, and the drugs were not discovered as a result of the
frisk. The State’s arguments are unpersuasive and not supported by the record. This
Court should vacate Mr. Tsui’s conviction, reverse the order denying his motion to
suppress, and remand this case to the district court for further proceedings.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Tsui included a statement of facts and course of proceedings in his opening
brief, which he incorporates herein by reference.
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Tsui’s motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Tsui’s Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
At the moment Officer Elias Martinez frisked Mr. Tsui, a reasonably prudent

person in the officer’s position would not have been justified in concluding Mr. Tsui was
armed and presently dangerous. The district court erred in concluding the frisk was
lawful.

The district court also erred in concluding the illegal drugs discovered on

Mr. Tsui were not discovered as a result of the frisk. It is clear from Officer Martinez’s
testimony at the suppression hearing that he did not smell marijuana until he was
standing right next to Mr. Tsui, “pat searching his torso.” (11/5/15 Tr., p.25, Ls.18-19.)
Because the drugs were discovered on Mr. Tsui as a result of the illegal frisk, they
should have been suppressed.
B.

The Frisk Of Mr. Tsui Violated The Fourth Amendment Because, At The Moment
Of The Frisk, Officer Martinez Did Not Have Reason To Believe Mr. Tsui Was
Armed And Presently Dangerous
The district court concluded Officer Martinez had reason to believe Mr. Tsui was

armed “under the circumstances within which the officers entered the residence [and]
under the way that [Mr. Tsui] presented to the officers and after the parolee came
downstairs.” (11/5/15 Tr., p.33, L.20 – p.34, L.2.) The district court erred. Officer
Martinez did not indicate specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, in light of his experience, justified his suspicion that
Mr. Tsui was armed and dangerous at the moment of the frisk.
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See State v.

Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 818-19 (2009) (stating test for determining whether a frisk is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment).
Mr. Tsui stated in his opening brief that “it is not clear what ‘circumstances’ the
district court is referring to with respect to the officers’ entry into Mr. Dixon’s residence.”
(App. Br., p.7.) The State argues in its brief that the district court was referring to “the
individual the officers encountered outside [Mr.] Dixon’s house and the delay in
[Mr.] Tsui coming downstairs after the officers entered the residence.” (Resp. Br., p.8.)
These factors add nothing to the analysis contained in Mr. Tsui’s opening brief and do
not suggest the frisk was lawful.
Officer Martinez testified that when he and his colleague arrived at Mr. Dixon’s
residence on the evening of March 18, 2015, they observed a vehicle “out in front” with
a male in the driver’s seat. (11/5/15 Tr., p.19, L.25 – p.20, L.3.) Officer Martinez asked
the driver if he was at Mr. Dixon’s house and he said, “No, I’m waiting for a friend,” and
indicated he was waiting for someone across the street. (11/5/15 Tr., p.20, Ls.3-6.)
Officer Martinez testified this was “an odd situation” because “it was late at night” and
“[t]he individual was not wanting to make eye contact.” (11/5/15 Tr., p.20, Ls.10-13.)
There was no further evidence regarding this individual, no identification of this
individual, and no argument as to how this individual’s presence may have contributed
to a concern that Mr. Tsui was armed and dangerous.
It is likewise unclear how Mr. Tsui’s supposed “delay” in coming downstairs may
have contributed to a concern that he was armed and dangerous. (Resp. Br., p.8.)
Officer Martinez testified that the woman who let them in to Mr. Dixon’s residence
summoned Mr. Dixon by saying, “Robby,” and then Mr. Dixon came downstairs.
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(11/5/15 Tr., p.21, Ls.2-7.) Officer Martinez asked Mr. Dixon “if there was anybody else
in the house and he said he had a friend upstairs.” (11/5/15 Tr., p.21, Ls.8-12.) There
was no testimony about the length of time it took Mr. Tsui to come downstairs, and the
district court found that Mr. Tsui came downstairs “shortly after Mr. [Dixon].” (11/5/15
Tr., p.30, Ls.18-20.) Mr. Tsui’s supposed “delay” in coming downstairs could not have
contributed to a reasonable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous when he was
not called downstairs and came down shortly after the person who was called.
In addition to these “circumstances,” the district court concluded Officer
Martinez’s frisk of Mr. Tsui was lawful based on “the way that [Mr. Tsui] presented to the
officers” after he came downstairs. (11/5/15 Tr., p.33, L.20 – p.34, L.2.) Mr. Tsui
presented to the officers by walking downstairs and denying he had weapons on him.
(11/5/15 Tr., p.23, Ls.13-24.) Officer Martinez testified he believed Mr. Tsui was armed
and presently dangerous because he was nervous and because, though he denied
having weapons, people often lie about that. (11/5/15 Tr., p.24, Ls.9-13, 22-25.) As
argued by Mr. Tsui in his opening brief, the fact that Mr. Tsui was nervous and that
people may lie about not having weapons would not justify a reasonably prudent person
in concluding that Mr. Tsui was armed and presently dangerous at the moment of the
frisk. (See App. Br., pp.7-10.) The district court thus erred in concluding the frisk was
lawful.
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C.

The Illegal Drugs Were Discovered On Mr. Tsui As A Result Of The Illegal Frisk
And Would Not Have Been Discovered But For The Frisk
The district court concluded the marijuana was not discovered on Mr. Tsui as a

result of the frisk because “Officer Martinez actually smelled the marijuana based on his
training and experience.” (11/5/15 Tr., p.34, Ls.3-7.) Mr. Tsui does not contest that,
based on his training and experience, Officer Martinez was able to identify the odor he
smelled when he was patting down Mr. Tsui’s torso as that of marijuana. The critical
question is whether Officer Martinez would have detected an odor of marijuana in the
absence of the illegal frisk.
Officer Martinez testified at the suppression hearing that he smelled marijuana as
he was patting down Mr. Tsui. (11/5/15 Tr., p.12, Ls.3-14.) Recognizing the sequence
of events as critical, the prosecutor asked Officer Martinez on redirect to “please
sequence it for us, the smell of the marijuana to the pat search and how that worked.”
(11/5/15 Tr., p.25, Ls.15-17.) Officer Martinez answered, “As I was pat searching his
torso and as I moved down his torso, I could smell marijuana pretty strong.” (11/5/15
Tr., p.25, Ls.18-22.) Officer Martinez never testified that he was able to smell marijuana
prior to the pat search, and the district court did not make a finding to that effect.
The States cites State v. Rigoulot, 123 Idaho 267, 272-73 (Ct. App. 1992), for the
proposition that “no search in the Fourth Amendment sense occurs when an officer,
lawfully present at a certain place, detects odors emanating from a private premises.”
(Resp. Br., p.4.) As Mr. Tsui explained in his opening brief, Rigoulot has no applicability
here because Rigoulet did not involve application of the exclusionary rule. (See App.
Br., pp.12-13.) The Court of Appeals concluded in Rigoulot that the officers’ detection
of marijuana did not constitute a search when they smelled the marijuana in an area of
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the curtilage that would be occupied by ordinary visitors. 123 Idaho at 272-73. Rigoulot
does not stand for the proposition that an officer’s detection of the odor of marijuana
should not be suppressed when the odor is only detected because of an unlawful frisk.
The exclusionary rule “applies to evidence obtained directly from the illegal
government action and to evidence discovered through the exploitation of the original
illegality, or the fruit of the poisonous tree.” Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811 (citations omitted).
“The test is whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to
which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of the original illegality
or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” Id.
(quotation marks and alterations omitted). Officer Martinez’s detection of an odor of
marijuana on Mr. Tsui cannot be distinguished or purged from the primary taint of the
unlawful frisk. Officer Martinez would not have detected the odor absent the frisk, and
his detection of the odor thus stems directly from the frisk. The district could should
have suppressed the marijuana found on Mr. Tsui and the methamphetamine
discovered in the subsequent search incident to his arrest.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, as well as those set forth in his opening brief,
Mr. Tsui respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction, reverse the district
court’s order denying his motion to suppress, and remand this case to the district court
for further proceedings.
DATED this 9th day of August, 2016.
__________/s/_______________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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